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ABSTRACT 
Provision of Social Goods and Soft Budget Constraints* 
by Lars-Hendrik Röller and Zhentang Zhang 
Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to provide a social good 
in addition to a private good, which makes it difficult for a government to commit not to 
bail out the firm once it is in financial trouble. This creates a soft budget constraint 
syndrome which causes the firm to underinvest ex ante in order to extract state subsidy 
and thereby reduces dynamic efficiency. In this paper, we show that separating the 
provision of social goods from private goods can harden budget constraints, while 
introducing competition into the private market may not. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Efficiency, Transitional Economy, Soft Budget Constraint, Social 
Goods, Subsidy 
JEL Classification: L13, L30 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Bereitstellung sozialer Leistungen und geringere Budgeteinschränkungen 
Unternehmen in sozialistischen und Übergangsländern sind oft verpflichtet, neben 
privatwirtschaftlichen auch soziale Aufgaben zu übernehmen.  Ob soziale Aufgaben 
von privaten Unternehmen oder von staatlichen Einrichtungen finanziert werden sollten, 
ist Gegenstand dieses Beitrags.  Es wird gezeigt, daß die Verquickung von 
privatwirtschaftlichem Interesse mit öffentlichen Aufgaben durch gehörige 
Anreizprobleme gekennzeichnet ist. So entsteht etwa ein erhöhter Druck auf die Politik 
die Unternehmen zu subventionieren, wenn diese in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten 
geraten.  Aufgrund dieser glaubwürdigen Absicherung seitens des Staates schwindet der 
Anreiz wettbewerbsfähige Strukturen in den Unternehmen umzusetzen, was in der 
Literatur unter dem Stichwort „soft budget constraint“ diskutiert wird.  In der 
vorliegenden Untersuchung wird gezeigt, daß eine saubere Trennungen von sozialen 
und  privaten Aufgaben für eine Entstehung von wettbewerbsfähigen Strukturen 
notwendig ist.  Die bloße Einführung von mehr Wettbewerbsdruck, ohne strukturelle 
Separierung, führt zu keinen marktwirtschaftlich sinnvollen Lösungen.  
                                                 
*  Acknowledgements:  We wish to thank seminar participants at the WZB, the 25th EARIE Conference 
at Copenhagen and the Australian Econometric Society Meeting at Sydney for their helpful 
comments. 
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1 Introduction
Enterprises in socialist and transitional economies are often mandated by
their governments to provide some social goods in addition to producing a
private good.1 These social goods include retraining redundant workers, pro-
viding housing, kindergartens, pensions and medical benefits to workers, etc.
For example, SOEs (state owned enterprises) in China, have been mandated
to provide so-called LIW (labor insurance and welfare) benefits to their ac-
tive and retired workers which cover pensions, medical care and other benefits
(see Table 1). In 1993, the LIW cost Chinese enterprises an estimated US$17
billion, which accounted for 34% of their total wage bill. Before the recent
economic reforms, the social good obligation did not impose any extra burden
on the SOEs because the state covered all the SOE expenditures. However,
as part of the economic reform, SOEs have become responsible for payment of
wages, medical care and pensions of their active and retired workers. Facing
competition from enterprises which provide little or no social goods, the obli-
gation to provide social goods has become a huge burden for Chinese SOEs
and considerably undermined their ability to stay viable. It is estimated that
over 50% of all Chinese SOEs were losing money in 1993. As a consequence
of these developments, these loss-making SOEs attempt to bargain with the
government for subsidies on the grounds that they were unable to meet their
LIW obligations. Indeed it was concern about possible SOEs failure to
maintain redundant workers and provide medical care and pensions that has
prompted the government to grant subsidies to financially distressed SOEs
(Hu 1997). In 1993, subsidies for loss-making SOEs amounted to some US$5
billion, which adds up to an incredible 9% of total government expenditure.
These subsidies, in theory, should only cover the SOE losses from the social
obligations. However, due to the information-asymmetry problem, it is very
diﬃcult for the state to distinguish between these losses from the operational
losses and consequently, the state in practice has to be responsible for all the
SOE losses and the budget constraints of SOE’s become soft (Lin, Cai and
Li 1998).
This kind of mandatory bundling of social goods with private goods is not
1Social good is defined as a good with a positive externality which must be provided or
subsidized by government if it is to be produced by a profit-maximizing firm. Universal
service, kindergardens, unemployment benefits, pension and medical cares are some of the
examples.
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immune to market economies. Firms in network industries have been obli-
gated to provide so-called universal service in addition to other services.2 In
fact, universal service obligation and natural monopoly arguments were com-
monly used to justify public and/or monopolistic control of certain network
industries. Before the recent liberalization of many European network indus-
tries, there was less competition and firms might be able to cover their losses
from universal service obligation by cross-subsidizing. However, as liberal-
ization introduced more competition, the ability of firms to cross-subsidize
is undermined.
The introduction of competition in the private goods market puts govern-
ment into a diﬃcult situation. In principle, there are two possible alterna-
tives: either firms are required to continue the provision of the social good
coupled with a subsidy to keep firms viable, or a separation of the provision
of social and private good is undertaken. This paper studies this trade-oﬀ.
As we will show, the first scenario will give rise to a soft budget constraint
syndrome, which dilutes the firms incentive to invest and thereby reduces
dynamic eﬃciency.
Imagine an economy consisting of a politician and two firms. The politician is
a self-interested economic agent who derives political benefit out of the provi-
sion of the social good. Firms are competing in the private good market. One
of the firms (so-called multiproduct firm) is required by the politician to pro-
vide a social good in addition to the private good. The provision of the social
good involves loss making. In addition to their production decisions, firms
can invest into becoming more eﬃcient. To make the problem interesting we
assume that the firm who produces both the social good and the private good
can stay in business only if it undertakes some investment to reduce its cost.3
Whenever the firm underinvests (and is consequently in financial trouble),
it bargains with the politician for a subsidy. The politician concern about
the provision of the social good and thereby concerns about the firm’s via-
2The objective of universal service obligations is to make sure that everyone, including
uneconomic customers in uneconomic areas, have access to certain essential services of
high quality at prices they can aﬀord (European Commision 1998).
3If the firm is viable without investing there would be no soft-budget constrain problem
and the firm would always have an incentive to become eﬃcient. In eﬀect that would be
the situation whenever the monopoly rents are large enought to cover the loss from the
provision of the social good, i.e. this can be thought of as the situation before competition
is introduced.
2
bility, allow the firm to extract a subsidy by credible threaten to shut down.
The firm, therefore, deliberately underinvests ex-ante, giving rise to the SBC
problem. When this happens, dynamic eﬃciency is undermined, consumers
are worse oﬀ due to the higher price from both the underinvestment and
softer competition in the private good market. However, the politician is
better oﬀ.
Given the existence of a SBC syndrome for multiproduct firm, we next study
how to harden the budget constraint. One way is to separate the provision
of social good from private good, in other words the social goods is provided
by a firm or government agency who specializes in supplying social goods.
When the provision of social good is detached from the provision of private
good, the multiproduct firm can no longer use its shutdown as a credible
threat and the SBC problem is eliminated. Facing competition in the private
good market, the firm will now have an incentive to become eﬃcient in the
provision of the private good. This finding suggests that the eﬃciency of
firms in the private sector crucially depends on the separation of social and
private provision. Note that this result does not depend on any exogenous
cost ineﬃciency that a multiproduct firm might have. Rather we show that
there are endogenous diseconomies of scope due to an incentive problem of a
multiproduct firm.
Another possibility for hardening the SBC might be to increase competi-
tion. As we mention above, the SBC problem only emerges when the cross-
subsidization does not cover the loss from the provision of social goods.
Moreover, as we show in this paper, increasing competition in the private
good market may even worsen the SBC problem. Increasing competition in
the private good market reduces the multiproduct firm’s profit, which makes
it more likely to use shutdown as a credible threat and to receive a subsidy,
further softening its budget constraint.
Our analysis suggests that social obligations, especially those involved loss-
making, should be detached from the enterprises. As long as the social
obligations remain, the politician always has incentive to subsidize the firm,
and the SBC problem will persist. This not only weakens the enterprises’
incentive to become eﬃcient and undermine their ability to restructure, but
also impose losses on consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we give related
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literature. In Section 3, we provide a basic set-up. In Section 4, we investigate
how the provision of social good induces the SBC syndrome, and the impact
of an increase in competition. In Section 5, we study means to harden budget
constraints and analyze the economic consequences from the SBC syndrome.
Section 6 gives conclusion and comments.
2 Related Literature
Soft budget constraint (SBC hereafter) is a term coined by Kornai (1979) as
a phenomenon that a funding source can not commit to keep an enterprise
to a fixed budget, i.e., the enterprise finds its budget constraint ”softened”
by the infusion of additional subsidy or credit when it is in financial trouble.
According to Kornai (1998), there are exogenous and endogenous explana-
tions for the SBC phenomenon. The exogenous explanation ascribes the
SBC mainly to political factors such as the politicians’ aim to gain political
support, the paternalism and the egalitarianism of the state, etc. The other
explanation views the SBC arising endogenously from a time inconsistency
problem.4 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) show that the SBC can arise from
the creditor’s inability to commit not to refinance the bad project ex ante
since marginal benefit of refinancing the bad project exceeds marginal cost
of abandoning it. This time inconsistency problem lies at the heart of many
other theoretical investigations (see for example, Qian and Roland (1998),
Qian and Xu (1998), Schaﬀer (1989)).
The exogenous political factors and the time inconsistency problem often
act together to induce the SBC problem. Segal (1998) shows the SBC phe-
nomenon may arise from a benevolent government’s decision to subsidize a
unprofitable monopoly since the social damage of shutting down the firm
exceeds the social cost of bailout. Schmidt (1996) demonstrates that the
public ownership may cause a benevolent government to subsidize a failing
firm and gives rise to the SBC problem. These two papers, however, impose
a strong assumption on the role of the government. Namely, the government
is a benevolent, fully rational social-welfare maximizer. In particular, there
4A diﬀerent explanation is oﬀered by Lin and Tan (1998). They attribute the SBC to
the state’s accountability problem.
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are no self-interested politicians. In contrast to Segal (1998) and Schmidt
(1996), our government is modeled as a self-interested politician who seeks
political gain. In both socialist and capitalist regimes, anecdotal evidence
suggests that politicians often use their political power to force firms to pro-
duce services and goods which are beneficial to them (Shleifer 1998). In a
totalitarian political system, the politicians’ main concern is social stability.
Keeping redundant workers oﬀ the street or supplying medical and pension
benefits to active and retired workers certainly helps to reduce the chance
of social unrest. On the other hand, in a democratic political system, the
politicians’ goal is to remain in oﬃce. Transferring wealth to certain groups
of society through social goods such as universal service may gain political
support for politicians and increase their chance to be elected.5 For this rea-
son we model the politician as someone who cares about the provision of the
social good.
A malnevolent politician has been modeled by Shleifer and Vishny (1994),
in which the relationship between a self-interested politician and a firm is
governed by incomplete contracts and the control right of the firm decides
the direction of bribe flows between the politician and the firm. By contrast,
we model the relationship between the politician and the firm through the
social good obligation and focus on the firms ability to make its shut-down
threat credible through underinvesting ex ante, in order to extract a subsidy.
In addition to the other papers mentioned above, we investigate ways in
which the SBC problem is eliminated within the a multiproduct context.
3 Model
In this section, we develop a model characterizing the game between a politi-
cian and two firms. The politician is a self-interested economic agent aiming
to maximize his utility. One of the firms (the multiproduct firm) is obliged to
provide a social good in addition to a private good. The multiproduct firm
5The univeral serivce obligation may be the outcome of a political process or result
from regulatory capture by some pressure groups and they are not necessarily motivate
by social welfare considerations (European Commision 1998).
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is competing with the other firm in the private good market. Firms can un-
dertake some investment to reduce their costs. The structure of the game is
as follow: at the first stage, the politician sets the amount of social good. At
stage 2, firms choose their cost-reduction investments noncooperatively. At
stage 3, the firms and the politician bargain over the magnitude of subsidy.
At stage 4, producing firms compete in the private good market.
The politician derives political benefit from the firm’s provision of social good.
In a totalitarian political regime, providing social protections to workers and
keeping redundant workers oﬀ the street help to reduce the chance of social
unrest, benefiting the politician. In a democratic political regime, universal
service may be used by the politician to transfer wealth to certain groups of
society and gain political support. Let qO (subscriptO for social good) denote
the quantity of social good and R(qO) denote the politician’s benefit from
the provision of qO. The firm uses its social good obligation to bargain for
subsidy when it is in financial trouble. The cost to the politician to provide
subsidy s is given by N(s). This cost can be interpreted as the political cost
of rasing taxes to finance the subsidy. The politician’s utility function is thus
given by
R(qO)−N(s); where R(0) = N(0) = 0, R0(·) > 0, N 0(·) > 0, R00(·) < 0,
N 00(·) > 0.
There are two firms: firm 1 and firm 2. Firm 2 is obliged to produce a social
good in addition to a private good. Firm 1 is assumed to produce only the
private good. These two firms compete in the private good market.
Cost function of firm 1 is given by c1q1, where c1 is constant.
Cost function of firm 2 is given by c2q2+cOqO, where c2 and cO are constant.
That is, the production cost of firm 2 consists of two parts: the cost of
producing private good, c2q2, and the cost of producing social good, cOqO.
There are two markets, A (private good market) and O (social good market).
Demand in market A is given by
pA(Q
A), QA = q1 + q2 is the total output of the private good.
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Demand in market O is given by
pO(qO), where qO is the quantity of social good.
In addition, each firm can undertake some investment xi to reduce its marginal
cost of producing the private good. The cost of investment is given by
I(xi), where 0 ≤ xi ≤ Xi , i = 1, 2. I(0) = 0, I 0(·) > 0, I 00(·) > 0,
reflecting diminishing return to the investment.
Firm 1’s profit function is then,
π1(x1, x2, q1, q2) = (pA − c1 + x1)q1 − I(x1).
Firm 2’s profit function (net of subsidy) is given by
π2(x1, x2, q1, q2, qO) = (pA − c2 + x2)q2 − I(x2) + (pO − cO)qO.
Firm 1 aims to maximize π1(·). Firm 2 maximizes (π2(·)+ s). The politician
chooses the amount of social good qO to maximize (R(qO) − N(s)), where
0 ≤ qO ≤ qO and pO( qO) = 0. That is, as long as the multiproduct firm is
producing the private good, it is obliged to provide social good.
The politician and firm 2 bargain over the amount of subsidy. The bargaining
game between them is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution, which
is given by
argmax
s∈Ω
(R(qO)−N(s)) (π2 + s) ;
where Ω = {(R(qO)−N(s),π2 + s) | 0 ≤ s ≤ s , s = N−1(R(qO ))} is the
feasible agreement set, which is compact and convex.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: p0A < 0 and p
00
AQ
A + 2p0A < 0. In addition, p
0
O < 0 .
This assumption is simply to ensure the existence and stability of a unique
solution to firms’ maximization problems.
Assumption 2: The production of social good is loss-making. That is,
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(pO − cO)qO ≤ 0.
Assumption 3: π2(X1, 0, qO) < 0 but π2(X1,X2, qO) > 0, where
pO( qO) = 0.
This assumption says that the multiproduct firm is making a loss without
investment but can stay viable if it undertakes full investment, given that
the rival firm invests in the full amount.
Assumption 4: ∂πi(·)
∂xi
> 0 and ∂πj(·)
∂xj
< 0 for i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2.
This assumption says that a firm’s investment raises its profit but reduces
its rival’s profits.
4 The SBC phenomenon
4.1 The Provision of Social Goods and the SBC syn-
drome
In contrast to Schmidt (1996) and Segal (1996), we model the SBC syndrome
arising from a time inconsistency problem of a self-interested politician in-
stead of a benevolent government. The introduction of competition in the
private goods market puts government into a diﬃcult situation. In principle,
there are two alternatives: either the firm continues to provide the social
good and receives subsidies from the government, or a separation of the pro-
vision of social good from private good is undertaken. In this section, we
investigates the eﬀect of the first scenario. The game between the politician
and the firms can be described as follows:
Game 1.
Stage 1. The politician sets the amount of social good.
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Stage 2. Firm 1 and firm 2 make their cost-reduction investment decisions
non-cooperatively.
Stage 3. The firms bargain with the politician over the size of subsidy. If
firms receive the subsidy, they produce. Otherwise, they decide to produce
or not.
Stage 4. Producing firms compete in private good market via Cournot.
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The following Lemma 1 describe the equilibrium behavior of firms at stage
4.
Lemma 1: For any given (x1, x2), there exists a unique equilibrium at Stage
4, q∗1(x1, x2) > 0 and q
∗
2(x1, x2) > 0 , where
q∗1(x1, x2, q
∗
2(q1)) = argmax
q1
π1(x1, x2) and
q∗2(x1, x2, q
∗
1(q2)) = argmax
q2
π2(x1, x2, qO).
Proof: By Assumption 3, any firm who did not produce would be better oﬀ
by investing at full amount X and producing. The rest of proof follows from
Assumption 1.
We now turn to the investment incentive of firm 1.
Lemma 2: At the subgame perfect equilibrium, firm 1 always undertakes full
investment regardless of firm 2’s investment decision. In addition, firm 1
gets no subsidy.
Proof: Since firm 1 does not provide the social good, it can not use its
shutdown as a credible threat in order to extract subsidy. Anticipating this,
facing the competition from firm 2 in private good market, it will invest in
full amount by Assumption 4.
Denote x02 as firm 2’s break even level of investment when providing the max-
imum amount of social good. That is, π2(X1, x02, qO) = 0. From assumption
3, we know that 0 < x02 < X2. Additionally, denote s
∗ = s∗(qO) as the
equilibrium amount of subsidy when SBC syndrome occurs.
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Now we are ready to investigate how firm 2’s obligation to supply the social
good together with the time inconsistency problem create the SBC syndrome.
Proposition 1: The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of Game 1 is as
follows:
a. If π2(X1,X2, qO) < s
∗(qO), then firm 2 invests x
0
2 (x
0
2 < X2), receives
subsidy s∗, provide qO of social good and produces q
∗
2(X1, x
0
2) of private good.
Firm 1 invests X1, receives no subsidy and produces q∗1(X1, x
0
2) of private
good.
b. If π2(X1,X2, qO) > s
∗(qO), then firm 2 invests X2, receives no subsidy,
provide qo of social good and produces q
∗
2(X1,X2) of private good. Firm 1
invests X1, receives no subsidy and produces q∗1(X1,X2) of private good.
c. If π2(X1, X2, qO) = s
∗(qO), then both a and b forms equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that when π2(X1,X2, qO) < s
∗(qO), i.e. when the multi-
product firm’s profit under full investment is lower than the subsidy it re-
ceives when it underinvests, it will choose to underinvest and thereby create
the SBC problem. The intuition behind this proposition 1 is straightforward.
The social good obligation makes firm’s threat not to produce become cred-
ible since its shutdown means that the social good is not provided, to the
harm of the politician. The firm thereby deliberately underinvests ex ante
to become unprofitable in order to extract subsidy. This softens the firm’s
budget constraint and gives rise to the SBC syndrome.
The following corollary describes the impact of increasing competition on the
likelihood that SBC syndrome occurs.
Corollary 1: The higher degree of competition in the private good market, the
more likely the SBC phenomenon arises.
Increasing competition in the private good market reduces price and lowers
the multiproduct firm’s profit, which raises the chance of firm 2 using its
shut-down as a credible threat, further softening the budget constraint.
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Moreover, the correlation between the size of the social good and the likeli-
hood that the SBC occurs can also be drawn from Proposition 1. From the
Nash bargaining solution between the politician and firm 2, we can derive
that ds
∗
dq∗O
= R
0
2N 0+N 00s∗ > 0. This is illustrated in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2: The bigger size the social good has, the more like the SBC
syndrome occurs.
This may explain why the SBC syndrome is much more widespread and
prevalent in socialist economies than in market economies . Enterprises in
socialist economies were obliged to provide a much wider range of social
goods than enterprises in market economies.
4.2 Harden Budget Constraint
In this section, we investigate means to eliminate the SBC syndrome. We
propose to separate the provision of social good from private good. After the
separation, firm 2 only produces the private good and can no longer use its
shutdown as a credible threat so as to extract subsidy.
Suppose the social good is now supplied by a government agency who only
specializes in the provision of a social good.
The profit functions of firms are given as follows, respectively:
Firm 1’s profit function is:
π1(x1, x2) = (pA − c1 + x1)q1 − I(x1).
Firm 2’s profit function is:
π2(x1, x2) = (pA − c2 + x2)q2 − I(x2).
The government agency’s profit function (net of subsidy) is:
πG(qO) = (pO − cO)qO.
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The politician chooses the amount of social good qO (0 ≤ qO ≤ qO ) to
maximize (R(qO)−N(s)).
The bargaining problem between the politician and the government agency
is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution, which is given by
argmax
s∈Ω
(R(qo)−N(s)) (πG + s)
Where Ω = {(R(qo)−N(s),πG + s) | 0 ≤ s ≤ s, s = N−1(R(qO ))} is the
feasible agreement set, which is compact and convex.
After the provision of social good is separated from the provision of private
good, firm 2 does not provide the social good and can not use its shutdown
as a credible threat. Facing the competition from each other in private good
market, they will invest in full amount by Assumption 4.
The game between the politician and the government agency is as follows:
Game 2.
Stage 1. The politician sets the size of social good.
Stage 2. Firm 1 and firm 2 make their cost-reduction investment decisions
non-cooperatively.
Stage 3. The government agency bargains with the politician for the subsidy.
If the government agency receives the subsidy, it provides the social good.
Otherwise, it decides to produce or not.
Stage 4. Firm 1 and 2 compete in private good market and the government
agency produces the social good.
Denote q∗1(x1, x2) and q
∗
2(x1, x2) as the equilibrium output of firm 1 and 2 at
stage 4, the following proposition says that separating the provision of social
good from private good will eliminates the SBC problem.
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of Game 2 is given as follow:6
6If the government agency is a non-profit organization, then s∗G = −πG, and q∗OG
satisfies that R0(qO) +N 0(s)dπGdqO = 0.
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The government agency produces q∗OG of social good and receives subsidy s
∗
G,
where 0 < q∗OG < qO.
Firm 1 and 2 receive no subsidies, invest full amount X, and produce q∗1(X,X)
and q∗2(X,X) of private good, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is, the government agency gets the subsidy and provides the social
good. On the other hand, the firms who produce in the private good market
invest the full amount and consequently the SBC problem is eliminated.
5 The economic consequences of the SBCProb-
lem
From the above analysis, we know that bundling the provision of social good
with private good may prevent the multiproduct firm from becoming eﬃcient
and reduce the dynamic eﬃciency. The other economic consequences caused
by the SBC syndrome are discussed in this section.
Proposition 3: The politician is better oﬀ from bundling the provision of
social and private good.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is to say, the politician benefits from forcing the firm to provide the
social good in addition to the private good. This is because when the social
good is supplied by the multiproduct firm, the loss in the provision of social
good is partially cross-subsidized by the firm’s profit in the private good
market, which increases the amount of social good provided, i.e. q∗OG < qO.
Therefore, it is always in the politician’s interest not to separate the provision
of social good from private good.
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Corollary 3 : Consumers in the private good market are worse oﬀ while the
recipients of social good are better oﬀ from bundling the provision of social
and private good.
When the SBC syndrome occurs, the multiproduct firm underinvests in order
to extract the subsidy. This reduces the competition and raises the price of
private good, harming the consumers. However, the recipients of social good
gain from the higher amount of social good provided.
Corollary 4. Firm 1 benefits when the SBC syndrome arises. Firm 2 (the
multiproduct firm) is worse oﬀ unless the size of the social good is suﬃciently
large.
Firm 1 is better oﬀ from the reduced competition in the private good market
due to firm 2’s underinvestment. This finding is rather surprising at the first
glance. During the liberalization of network industries, it is often argued
that granting subsidy to the multiproduct firm (often the incumbent firm) to
ensure the provision of social good creates disadvantages to the competing
firm (often the entrant). However, from a dynamic point of view, anticipating
to be bailed out when it is in financial trouble causes the incumbent to
underinvest in order to exact subsidy and consequently, it becomes a ”softer”
competitor, to the benefit of the entrant.
On the other hand, if the size of the social good is small, the amount of
subsidy received by firm 2 is low. And firm 2 is worse oﬀ from bundling the
provision of social and private good.
The policy implication can be drawn from the above analysis is that detach-
ing the provision of social good from private good is important to help the
enterprises in transitional economies become eﬃcient. As long as the enter-
prises continue to provide the social good, the SBC syndrome will persist.
This not only weakens the enterprises’ incentive to become eﬃcient and un-
dermine their ability to restructure, but also imposes losses on consumers.
Increasing competition may deteriorate the SBC syndrome and magnify its
negative economic consequences if the separation of social good from the pri-
vate good is not undertaken. This suggests that universal service should be
provided by a government agency or a firm who specializes in supplying it.
Separating the provision of universal service from other services will eliminate
the SBC problem and help to detain the benefits from the liberalization.
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6 Conclusions and Future research
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the politician’s personal benefit
from bundling the provision of social good and private good makes the firm
be able to use its shutdown as a credible threat and extracts ex post a bigger
subsidy than would have been considered eﬃcient ex ante, giving rise to the
SBC syndrome. Consequently, firm’s dynamic eﬃciency is reduced and its
competitiveness is undermined. Consumers in the private good market are
worse oﬀ while the recipients of social good are better oﬀ.
Also, we have shown that increasing competition in the private good market
may deteriorate the SBC problem and its negative economic consequences,
unless the provision of social good and private good is separated. After the
separation, the firm only produces the private good and its threat to shut-
down is nullified Facing the competition from the other firm, it will invests
in full amount to reduce its cost, hardening the budget constraint. This sug-
gests that the eﬃciency of a multiproduct firm in the private sector crucially
depends on the separation of social and private provision. The bundling pro-
vision of social and private good results in endogenous diseconomies of scope
due to an incentive problem of the multiproduct firm.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: We solve Game 1 by backward induction.
At stage 4, from Lemma 1, firm 1 and 2’s quantity of the private good is
given respectively, by
q∗1(x1, x2), q
∗
2(x1, x2).
At stage 3, the politician and the firms bargain over the size of subsidy. Firm
1 receives no subsidy from Lemma 2. For firm 2, there are two cases:
Case 1: Firm 2’s threat not to produce is credible only if π2(X1, x2, qO) ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to x2 ≤ x02(qO) since π2(X1, x2, qO) is monotonically
increasing in x2. The optimal amount of subsidy received by firm 2, s∗ =
s∗(X1, x2, qO) satisfies that
−N 0( s∗) (π2 + s∗) + (R(qO)−N(s∗)) = 0. (1)
In this case, the payoﬀ of firm 2 is π2(X1, x2, qO) + s∗(X1, x2, qO).
Case 2: Firm 2’s threat to shut-down is not credible if π2(X1, x2, qO) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to x2 ≥ x02(qO). In this case, the politician simply opti-
mally chooses s∗ = 0 since −N 0(s) < 0. The payoﬀ of firm 2 is π2(X1, x2, qO).
At stage 2, firms choose their cost-reduction investments non-cooperatively.
From Lemma 2, firm 1 will optimally choose x1 = X1. For firm 2, there are
two cases:
Case 1: since (π2(X1, x2, qO)+ s∗(X1, x2, qO)) is monotonically increasing in
x2, firm 2 will optimally invest x2 = x02(qO) and its payoﬀ is simply s
∗.7
Case 2: since π2(X1, x2, qO) is monotonically increasing in x2, firm 2 will
optimally invest x2 = X2 and gets π2(X1,X2, qO).
At stage 1, the politician chooses the amount of social good to maximize
its utility, (R(qO) − N(s∗)). In both cases, the politician optimally chooses
7From the Nash bargaining solution , it is trivial to derive that ∂(π2+s
∗)
∂x2
= ∂π2
∂x2
∗
N
00
(s∗)∗(π2+s∗)+N
0
(s∗)
N 00 (s∗)∗(π2+s∗)+2N 0 (s∗)
> 0 for any x2 ≤ x02(qO).
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the maximum amount of social good qO = qO . This is because in Case 1,
R0(q∗O) − N 0(s∗) ds
∗
dq∗O
> 0.8 And in Case 2, R0(qO) > 0. Therefore, firm 2’s
payoﬀ is s∗2(X1, x
0
2, qO) in Case 1 and π2(X1,X2, qO) in Case 2.
The rest of the proof is straightforward by comparing firm 2’s payoﬀ in two
cases. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
At stage 4, firm 1 and 2’s quantity of the private good is given, respectively,
by
qA∗1 (x1, x2), q
A∗
2 (x1, x2).
At stage 3, the politician and the government agency bargain over the size
of subsidy. Since the provision of social good always involves loss, i.e.
πG(qO) ≤ 0, the government agency’s threat to shut down is always credible.
Therefore, The optimal amount of subsidy, s∗G(qO), (R(qO)−N(s)) satisfies
that
−N 0( s∗G) (πG + s∗G)+(R(qO)−N(s∗G)) = 0. (2)
At stage 2, firm 1 and 2 choose full investment X1 and X2, respectively.
At stage 1, the politician selects the amount of social good to maximize
(R(qO)−N(s∗G)).
That is, the politician optimally chooses the amount of social good qO = q∗OG,
where q∗OG satisfies that R
0(q∗OG)−N 0(s∗G)
ds∗G
dq∗OG
= 0.9 That is,
R0N 00(πG+s∗G)+R
0N 0−(N 0)2 dπG
dqO
2N 0+N 00(πG+s∗G)
= 0.10 The government agency’s payoﬀ is thereby
given by (πG(q∗OG)+s
∗
G(q
∗
OG)) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: From the proof of Proposition 2, we have that
8Totally diﬀerenticatong equation (1), we have that ds
∗
dqO
= R
0
2N 0+N 00s∗ .
9Totally diﬀerenticatong equation (2), we have that ds
∗
G
dqO
=
R0−N 0 dπGdqO
2N 0+N 00(πG+s∗G)
.
10It is trivial that 0 < q∗OG < qO
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q∗OG < qO. Thus, (R(qO)−N(s∗))− (R(q∗OG)−N(s∗G)) > 0 if s∗ < s∗G. In
addition, from equation (1) and (2), we know that at the subgame perfect
equilibrium
(R(qO)−N(s∗))−(R(q∗OG)−N(s∗G)) = N 0( s∗)s∗−N 0( s∗G) (πG + s∗G), which is
greater than zero if s∗ > s∗G. Therefore, (R(qO)−N(s∗))−(R(q∗OG)−N(s∗G))
> 0. That is, the politician is always better oﬀ from bundling the provision
of social good and private good. Q.E.D.
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Table 1: Labor Insurance and Welfare Expenditures by sector, 1978-93 (yuan
billion, 1 US$=8 yuan)
Year SOEs Total
1978 6.7 7.8
1979 9.5 10.7
1980 11.9 13.6
1981 13.6 15.5
1982 15.7 18.1
1983 18.3 21.3
1984 21.3 25.8
1985 27.4 33.2
1986 34.4 42.0
1987 41.6 50.9
1988 53.8 65.3
1989 63.6 76.8
1990 77.7 93.8
1991 91.3 109.5
1992 109.6 131.0
1993 138.7 167.0
Source: HU (1997).
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